CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT IN COLOMBIA AND ECUADORINDIGENOUS MOVEMENT IN COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR

The third chapter focuses on the assessment of the impact of indigenous movements in Ecuadorian and Colombian society. I argue that the evaluation of the “success” or impact of social mobilisation is problematic because the meaning of the notion of “success” is itself ill-defined. Even the literature on social movements there is a gap between what theorists see as the goal of movements and the empirical objects of study.[66]Lowi stresses the lack of consensus about what constitutes a movement’s success: “some researchers reading simple survival as an indicator of success; others insisting on systemic social change as their standard; and others assuming that the natural end of social movements is to become an interest group”.[67]

In relation to this two main points are developed. First of all there is the theoretical approach to the assessment of the success of social mobilisation and its application to the indigenous case. Secondly, there is an analysis of the cause of the different outcomes of the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Colombia.

Evaluating the success of social movements..

The evaluation of the “success” or the impact of social mobilisation is problematic if it implies a limited set of outcomes. This is because social mobilisation can have many effects, as Munckpoints out:

“Most commonly, social movements are assessed in terms of their ability to “translate” their practices and mobilisation potential into political action. Indeed, the impact of social movements on the political system has to be the ultimate test of their promises. However, an all-or-nothing evaluation may not be the most adequate in the study of ongoing promises”.[68]

Therefore, social movements cannot be expected to transform the structure of domination[69] but can influence the political institutions and political parties by integrating new issues into the political agenda.[70] In Escobar and Alvarez opinion the “symbolic changes” posed by social movements have sometimes pushed other political and social actors, especially institutional actors such as parties, to reformulate their political programmes and to rethink concepts such as democracy and citizenship.[71]Willson argues that “to have a significant impact on democratic politics, social movements must do more than simply achieve a few specific objectives; They must make some lasting changes in attitudes behaviour, and/ or policies”.[72] Within this context Findji thinks that indigenous people present a challenge to the dominant culture and socieoconomic models of Latin American societies and contribute to democratise the country and redefine the concept of development.[73]

In order to give a concrete analysis of the scope of the assessment of social movements it is split into two main areas. The first is related to political impact and the other to cultural and social impact. Political impactis mainly studied through Resource Mobilisation Theory[74] and gives general outlines to the researcher; acceptance of the movement as a valid representative within the political and social arena, material rewards - as changes in the legislation -, shifts in the relation with political agents or incursion of new issues into the political agenda. Cultural and social impact is connected with New Social Movement Theory and focuses on social and political behavioural changes.

Gamson establishes two criteria to assess the outcomes of the movement. One concerned with the fate of the challenging group as an organisation and the other with the distribution of new advantages to the group’s beneficiary. The former is focused on the acceptance of the movement as a valid spokesman by its antagonists The latter describes whether the groups’ beneficiary gains “new advantages” during the challenge and its aftermath. Gamson constructs four possible outcomes in relation to these two categories: Full response, co-optation, pre-emption and collapse. The full response and collapse categories are related to the acceptance of new advantages or non achievements. Whereas, co-optation is used for acceptance and pre-emption for new advantages without acceptance.[75]

Table 1. Outcomes of Resolved Challenges

Acceptance New  Full None Advantages Many Full response Pre-emption None Co-optation Collapse

Source: From William Gamson, the Strategy of Social protest. Homewood III. Dorsey, p.29

Similarly, Gamson points out that new advantages are not always easy to define. Some groups seek shifts in the scope of authority or changes in procedures whereas others just seek material benefits.[76]

Gamson’s classification was mainly focused on the outcomes of 53 challenging groups of North America between 1800 and 1945.[77] The fate was useful to know how the organisational characteristics influence the success of their challenges, however these categories are quite rigid to be generically applied to any social movement. In the Latin American case and more specifically to the indigenous social movement, this classification does not fully represent the outcomes of the movement. The indigenous movements in Ecuador might be included within the category of co-optation in the sense of being accepted as a valid spokesman and little rewards achieved. However, it cannot be said that they are co-opted in the sense of being an institutionalised movement or controlled by the government. On the other hand, Colombian indigenous movements might be included somewhere between co-optation and full- response. This movement has achieved material rewards and social and political acceptance. Yet, to say that they have achieved full-response does not illustrate the indigenous case as many goals have not been completed. Moreover, it can be argued that Colombian indigenous movements are more institutionalised and co-opted by the government despite receiving more material rewards than the Ecuadorian case.

Despite the gap within Gamson’s theoretical framework his classification can be applied to a certain extent to the indigenous case. As it has been said both movements have reached political and social representation in each country. Furthermore, within the category of material rewards should be included the legal impact of movements. 

Landman argues that a progressive scale can be established within the level of legal impact. A low level legal-institutional impact means only impact on existing political parties and agendas, a medium level consists of an impact on existing parties and the formation of new parties, or an impact on legislation. A high level of impact consists of the first two plus constitutional changes.[78] In Colombia, indigenous people have achieved a high level impact as their rights have been recognised, for the first time, in the 1991 National Constitution. The new constitution recognises Colombia as a multiethnic and pluricultural State[79] (see Appendix C), something that the government of Ecuador denies absolutely.[80] Moreover, in 1982 the Colombian indigenous movements achieved the withdrawal of the Indigenous Statute which had allowed the President of the Republic the right to elaborate an Administrative Department for Indigenous Affairs and create an Institution for Indigenous Development, without consulting indigenous communities.[81] Other legislation successes are 1993 Laws 115 and 1088. The former guarantees bilingual education to indigenous communities, and their native language is considered the first language within their territory. The latter regulates the creation of Cabildos or Traditional Indigenous Authorities.[82]Despite indigenous achievements which have helped to democratise and open-up the political system they often appear as governmental success because they have been co-opted.[83]

By contrast, the indigenous movement in Ecuador has hardly achieved institutional change but on the other hand it has been successful in politicising new issues and putting their concerns on the political agenda. Moreover, it can be said that CONAIE has been accepted as an elected delegate in political negotiations, with the government. Issues such as land and oil-concessions - two of the hottest topics in Ecuadorian policy-making -have to take into account the indigenous question. The strength of the indigenous movements was illustrated, during 1994, when they organised an uprising against new areas designated for oil exploitation and development, supported by students, peasants and workers. Later on, President Sixto Duran Ballen’s intention to abolish the Agrarian Reform, led to a major indigenous protest endorsed by left, centre-left parties, writers, and media personalities. “These conflicts underline the deep political and cultural division between the liberal government in Quito and the communally based Indians”.[84]

Therefore, although indigenous people in Colombia have won more legal and institutional changes, it is the Ecuadorian indigenous movements that are present in the daily life of society and in policy-making.

Factors which affect success.

The impact of social movements should be evaluated as well through the Political Opportunity Structure of each country. Narrow distinguishes the “internal” resources of social movement organisation from the “external” political environment.[85]

Within internal resource mobilisation Narrow highlights group solidarity, leaders and organisation. Group solidarity is frequently assumed to be the keystone to success[86]. The role of the leaders is criticised by Piven and Cloward. They believe that leaders per se induce failure or tend to direct groups’ efforts towards institutional politics, rather than towards a radical permanent change. Regarding organisation, Gamson points out that bureaucratised groups are more moderate and more likely to achieve advantages for their members than non-bureaucratised ones.[87]

With regard to “external” environmental factors Narrow suggests that policy responses to protest appear to be affected by the openness or closure of formal institutions. In addition, the success of the movement very much depends on the alliance made by protest groups in support for their policy demands.[88] Jenkins andPerrow argue that movements are successful when there is a combination of sustained outside support and disunity and/or tolerance on the part of political elite.[89] But this concept has to be treated with care in the Latin American context. Researchers on Latin American squatters movements have shown how many of these groups have been seen as the appendages of political party organisations or elites.[90]

Indigenous movement leaders concentrate on the strength of unity of their members and on sensitising indigenous people to the idea that the achievement of their goals depends very much on solidarity among the members. This task is very important when taking into account the fact that traditionally each indigenous group has limited a sense of solidarity to its own community. In addition, leaders shape the relationship with political actors. In the case of Ecuador, CONAIE’s leader, Luis Macas, has followed a radical and confrontational tactic against the government. In the case of Colombia, there is no such strong “figure” but leaders have still determinated the relationship with the state leading to a more institutionalised situation. Moreover, both indigenous movements have joined with other social sectors such as urban, women’s, students and peasants groups, in order to claim for economic and social rights.

Politically, constitutional changes within the 1991 Colombian National Constitution include for the first time political representation of minorities groups like religious, Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities.[91]In the national elections of 1994, Indigenous leaders gathered 108,119 votes whereas Afro-Colombian leaders obtained only 131,07 votes.[92] This differentiation is remarkable taking into account that Indigenous population represents 1.75% of the society and Afro-Colombian people 30%[93]of the country. This differentiation reflects that indigenous communities are more organised and “able to develop a political project independent from traditional parties”[94], whereas Afro-Colombian concerns have tended to be included within the Liberal party.[95]

On the other hand, the vote acquired by Colombian indigenous leaders in the elections of 1994 was still very low as they only gathered 108,119 votes from 620,052 of the total Indian population. Therefore, indigenous political programs are still “far from being a coherent alternative with a national alternative project”.[96]

Table 2. Indigenous leaders votes in the 1994 National Elections in Colombia

Special circunscriptions
Lorenzo Muelas Hurtado	28,366
Gabriel Mujuy Jacanamejoy	14,245
Remedios Fajardo	7,222
National circunscriptions
Franciso Rojas Birry	20,453
Jesús Enrique Piñacue	16,452
Floro Alberto Tunubalá	12,413
Bonifacio Chicunque	5,779
Andres Agreda Chicunque	3,468
TOTAL	108,119

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil de Bogota (Colombia).1994

Moreover, the indigenous electoral circumscription elected as representative, for the Senate, Lorenzo Muelas Hurtado from Movimiento de Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia and Gabriel Jacanamejoy from the Movimiento Comunidades Indigenas de Colombia.[97]

By contrast, the situation in Ecuador was different. Ecuadorian politics has oscillated between elections and military take-overs. This political oscillation in no way negates the role of formal political parties however party alliances and opposition must be seen “within the broader framework of caudillo- military oscillation”.[98] However, from1987 onwards a broad spectrum of political parties arise in Ecuador but this diversity just “tries to satisfy the ambition of certain sectors”.[99] During this period indigenous movements in Ecuador did not form a political party, however it is worth noting how these regions with majority indigenous population were predominant centre-left voter whereas, the political spectrum of the rest of the country was more heterogeneous. In 1990 elections, in the Amazon region of Morona Santiago, 94.6% of the votes were centre-left, in the Sierra region of Chimborazo - with indigenous peasants majority - 37.3% was left, 27.6% centre-left and 22.4% centre-right. In the Pastaza region, the less populated of the Amazon region, the left party was predominant during the elections of 1978, 1986 and 1990. The province of Imbabura, north of the Sierra region, is centre-left vote but it is decreasing in favour to the left party. Finally, the province of Napo, the most populated of the Amazon region, centre-right tendency predominated during previous decades, but from the 1978 elections onwards there has been a shift to the centre-left.[100] Indigenous movements have been identified with left parties from the very beginning, in fact the indigenous discourse is immersed within the Marxist speech.

On the other hand, despite political tendencies of indigenous people in Ecuador and Colombia traditional parties do not represent only indigenous needs but large sectors of the society. The fact that in Colombia 40%[101]of the population lives under the poverty line and in Ecuador 70%[102]of the populations lacks minimum socio-economic rights, the representation of the political parties does not really exist. As Anglade argues absolute levels of poverty determine “social exclusion which in turns is indicative of political exclusion”.[103]

Finally, the assessment of social movements should also to be focused at the level of value- behaviour impact. Escobar and Alvarez talk about political practice and culture. For political practice these authors argue that cycles of protest in history have contributed to new forms of action which are understand as “doing politics”. The focus is on the ways in which daily life is politicised and on the new domains of social conflict that give rise to political forms of expression.[104] Narrow adds that these “modular” forms of collective action, once learned, can be adopted by other movements through time and space and include “demonstrations, land invasions, sit-ins, public meetings, strikes and rallies”.[105]In relation to this point, indigenous movements in Ecuador are leading social mobilisation, mainly trough demonstrations, in a situation in which large sectors of the population are socially and economically excluded. The achievement of indigenous movements has been to introduce new issues into the political agenda and to offer new ways of political participation. CONAIE’s claims are explicit:

“...we want people to be conscious of the fact that there are other, more participatory forms of government, where citizens can have a greater role with his or her opinions and not merely go to the voting booth... we have gathered the general discontent with this mode of politics. These old forms of governing have exhausted themselves and we believe that everyone has the obligation to participate in the challenge of governing ourselves...”[106]

For political culture, Escobar and Alvarez argue that in addition to challenging the ways in which people understand political practice, social movements also challenge the relation of that practice to “culture, economy, society and nature". Moreover, they criticise the empirical simplification and political reductionism that led researchers to focus their attention “on the measurable aspects of protest, such as confrontation with the political system and the impact on states policies consequently they disregard the less visible effects at the levels of culture and everyday life”.[107]Over the last decade, Colombian and Ecuadorian societies have realised that the indigenous question concerns the whole of society. The increase of indigenous participation in political life in Ecuador means “that the Ecuadorian society rejects the cultural order on which the political system is based. But this integration will be slow as the social structure and social status are impregnated within the political system”.[108] For Findji the last twenty years of Indian struggle, which now finds its specific expression in proposals for general political rearrangement, suggests that the indigenous struggle has generated a social movement whose outcomes will affect and depend not only on the indigenous society but society as a whole. “What remains to be seen is which non-indigenous sector will accept and incorporate into their own actions the challenges posed by the movement”.[109]This should not leave aside the idea that national society can radically reject the indigenous proclamation of self-identity, because it can be seen as a threat to national sovereignty.

However, the behaviour impact is even more sensitive to study than the political impact. Concepts such as “lifestyle, dreams and even identity formation are difficult to measure”[110]and as a result these notions have been excluded from empirical studies.

The second part of this chapter examines why indigenous movements have resulted indifferent outcomes in Ecuador and Colombia. This issue is connected with the representation of indigenous communities in the total population. Ecuador’s indigenous population represents 24,85% of the total, with 12 different ethnic groups; in Colombia it is only 1,74%, with a striking 81 different ethnic groups.[111]This difference shapes the degree of indigenous identity and consciousness and therefore the formulation of the propositions and the movement’s relationship with other sectors of society. The huge number of ethnically different indigenous communities in Colombia makes the existence of a unified national movement difficult. In Ecuador they are gathered under a relatively unified national confederation of indigenous people.

Although in both countries indigenous people stress their ethnicity as something unique and different from peasants, the degree of this consciousness is distinct. This differentiation could be found even during the formation of the first indigenous movements in both countries. In 1964 the origin of the Federacion de Centros Shuar of the Southwest Ecuadorian Amazon, reinforced the sense of indigenous identity as a way of opposing the penetration of colonisation and of protecting their territory.[112] This sense of ethnicity has spread to other communities, who no longer want to be identified as peasants. By contrast, in the creation of the Consejo Regional de Indigenas del Cauca (CRIC) in Colombia no ethnic vision served as frame of reference for its conception. The organisation was born out of the Terrajeros system and was concerned with land claims. The indigenous movement in Colombia tended, from the very beginning, to look for alliances with other marginalized sectors of society. Even during the First National Indigenous Congress, held in Medellín in 1982, CRIC considered the indigenous struggle in terms of class conflict and the need for social alliances to fight against their “oppressive” situation.[113]

The level of ethnic identity has tended to shape the demands of each indigenous movement. In the case of Colombia, the Organizacion Nacional de Indigenas de Colombia (ONIC) rejects the radical conception of “Indigenismo Cósmico”.[114] ONIC is not against “European ideas” or modern ways of life, but against “imperialism or any kind of oppressive system”.[115] This belief seems quite moderate in comparison with CONAIE’s, whose discourse is always related to indigenous traditional ways of life, such as communitarian life and the rejection of any capitalist influence.[116]

This degree of ethnic consciousness influences the struggle from the point of view of" Indigenous Nationalities” (Nacionalidades Indigenas).This theory supports the idea that the indigenous situation should be understood in terms of “nations” or “national minorities”. There is a conflict between the “indigenous nation” and the “national” nation in which the former is oppressed by the latter. Hence, the main goal should be self-determination of the indigenous nation. The ONIC in Colombia rejects the notion of “ethnic nationalities” for two reasons: One is that the degree of acculturation and assimilation of indigenous communities has been very unequal leading to a low degree of identity consciousness. And secondly, because the demand for self-determination may endanger alliances with other sectors of society, so they prefer to be called “national minorities” rather than “indigenous nationalities”.[117]On the contrary, at the top of the CONAIE agenda is the recognition of indigenous territory and their right to manage their own affairs: government, the economy, social relations, and education. Consequently, self-determination is the main goal of this indigenous movement together with an amendment of the Constitution where Ecuador would be recognised as amulti-national and multicultural State.[118]

Despite this radical claim, CONAIE has been able to preserve the unity of the demands of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, whereas in Colombia there is a conflict between the ONIC and other more extremist organisations, like the Movimiento de Autoridades Indigenas del Cauca (MAIC). Even during the First Indigenous National Congress in Colombia, in 1982, ONIC recognised the lack of agreement over strategy and political reivindication among different indigenous movements.[119]

The capacity for integration is related to the notion of the relative autonomy of the movement. CONAIE reflects a radical struggle against indigenous government policy but ONIC seems more institutionalised. Not only was the ONIC constitution itself was backed by the Colombian government, but its policy tends to demand State intervention in the form of social services and benefits[120], therefore nullifying indigenous initiatives. Looking at the outcomes it can be concluded that the institutionalisation of the indigenous movements seems unavoidable if they want to succeed, in the long run, in the economic and legal sphere. Therefore, the movement’s loss of autonomy seems related to institutional concessions.

The contradiction that every social movement faces between autonomy and integration in order to succeed is underline within the literature itself. Evers points out that after a phase of broadening mobilisation around certain issues social movements gain some access to established political structures and the movement falls into decay “at least as an authentic expression of determinate social interest and as an experience of vivid social life”.[121] Equating failure and integration in Scott’s point of view is the result off “fetishized” view of social movements: the view that “the movement is everything, an end in itself”. And he adds “while integration does typically mean the disappearance of the movement as a movement, it is at the same time the criterion of the movement’s success”.[122]

Summing up, this chapter has run through the theoretical approach for the assessment of what constitutes the “success” of social movements and in particular indigenous movements in Ecuador and Colombia. Therefore it has analysed political outcomes, such as the level of political acceptance of indigenous movements, economic and legal rewards from state institutions and cultural and behavioural impact.

The more institutionalised Colombian indigenous movements have achieved important legal and economic rewards from the government whereas their counterparts, in Ecuador have followed a strategy of confrontation leading to more visible social and political pressure in the daily life but with little material achievements.